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INTRODUCTION 
There is a long-running debate between environmentalists and 
advocates of free trade.
1
 Environmentalists generally argue that free trade 
leads to a “race to the bottom” and “pollution havens,” wherein the 
countries with the worst environmental (or other) protections are 
rewarded.
2
 Free trade advocates most often argue that such issues should 
simply stay out of trade agreements, sometimes adding that freer trade 
leads to economic gains and increased quality of life, followed by greater 
environmental and labor protections as citizen expectations change.
3
 Both 
sides, however, are beginning to agree that disputes arising under 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., David A. Gantz, Labor Rights and Environmental Protection Under NAFTA and 
Other U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 297 (2011); Annie Lowrey, 
Obama and G.O.P. Facing Opposition to Trade Pacts, N.Y. TIMES (January 30, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/business/reid-pushes-back-on-fast-track-trade-authority.html.  
 2. Linda J. Allen, The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: Has It 
Fulfilled Its Promises and Potential? An Empirical Study of Policy Effectiveness, 23 COLO. J. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 121, 125–26 (2012). 
 3. Chris Wold, Taking Stock Trade’s Environmental Scorecard After Twenty Years of “Trade 
and Environment”, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 325 (2010). 
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international trade and investment agreements raise not only commercial 
issues, but also important questions of public policy.
4
 
The above debate provides no clear solution; therefore, a more 
effective inquiry is to explore whether a country can improve its 
protections for the environment, given a particular provision of 
international investment law called Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS). International investment is a distinct area of law from trade, but 
often overlaps both conceptually and practically.
5
 Most criticism of 
investment agreements arises as one part of a critique implicating all 
international economic law and is most often framed as trade.
6
 Thus, the 
language of that discourse is applicable here. At the heart of most such 
criticism is a concern that big corporate entities disproportionately control 
and benefit from international economic agreements
7
 as corporations 
become larger
8
 and more influential in global politics and trade 
 
 
 4. UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements II, 13 (2014), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaeia 
2013d2_en.pdf. 
 5. Rudolf Dolzerand & Christoph Schreuer, Nature, Evolution, and Context of International 
Investment Law, in PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 2, 2 (1st ed. May 28, 2008) 
(“Today, it remains a matter of semantics whether it is appropriate to speak of the existence of a 
separate category of ‘principles of foreign investment law’, given their strong links to international 
economic law in general[, which includes trade law].”) For example, international investment law can 
be rooted in a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which only deals with investment issues, or as a 
distinct chapter within a broader bilateral or multilateral trade agreements like Chapter 11 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, to be discussed in greater depth below. 
 6. For example, Public Citizen’s criticism of investment law is within their “Global Trade 
Watch” division, About Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen. 
org/Page.aspx?pid=3147 (last visited Oct. 16, 2014); Similarly, the Center for International 
Environmental Law’s criticism of investment law is within their “Trade and Sustainable 
Development” Program, Trade & Sustainable Development Program Homepage, Center for 
International Environmental Law, http://www.ciel.org/Trade_Sustainable_Dev/index.html (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2014). 
 7. See, e.g., Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes 
Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 73 (2002) (arguing that foreign corporate investors are able to 
unfairly avoid legal liability under the investment chapter of NAFTA, one of the most influential 
modern free trade agreements.); David A. Gantz, Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and 
Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 651 (2001); 
Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the 
Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 301 (2004); Sanford E. Gaines, 
Protecting Investors, Protecting the Environment: the Unexpected Story of NAFTA Chapter 11, in 
GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 173 
(David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003).  
 8. Some multinational corporations are becoming so large that their revenue is larger than many 
countries’ GDPs. For example, Wal-Mart’s revenue is larger than the GDP of 157 countries. Vincent 
Trivett, 25 US Mega Corporations: Where They Rank If They Were Countries, BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 
2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/25-corporations-bigger-tan-countries-2011-6?op=1.  
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negotiations.
9
 This power dynamic is manifested in the implementation of 
ISDS provisions, which enable foreign investors to file claims against 
governments
10
 in an international arbitration
11
 forum, as long as the 
foreign investor is covered by an International Investment or Free Trade 
Agreement
12
 between the investor’s home country and the host country 
that includes ISDS provisions.  
These questions are urgent, especially for those concerned about the 
environment, in the face of two realities. First, there are two trade 
agreements currently being negotiated that have the potential to transform 
the global economic landscape and are likely to include ISDS provisions: 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) between the 
European Union and United States,
13
 and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) involving twelve nations of the Asia-Pacific region.
14
 Second, there 
is near universal scientific consensus that climate change is caused in part 
by humans and that the global community is almost too late to prevent its 
extreme weather consequences.
15
 
 
 
 9. See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Danny Hakim, Lobbying Bonanza as Firms Try to Influence 
European Union, N.Y. TIMES, October 18, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
10/19/world/europe/lobbying-bonanza-as-firms-try-to-influence-european-union.html; CORP. EUR. 
OBSERVATORY, Civil society groups say no to investor-state dispute settlement in EU-US trade deal 
(2013), available at http://corporateeurope.org/trade/2013/12/civil-society-groups-say-no-investor-
state-dispute-settlement-eu-us-trade-deal. 
 10. The top countries against which disputes are brought by investors are, in order: Argentina, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico, Czech Republic, Canada, Egypt, and United States. According to the 
UNCTAD, the first state-initiated dispute was raised in 2012. UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note: Recent 
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Updated for the Multilateral Dialogue on 
Investment 1, 4 (2013), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ webdiaepcb2013d3_ 
en.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) [hereinafter IIA Issues Note]. See also Inna Uchkunova, ICSID: 
Curious Facts, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 25 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/ 
2012/10/25/icsid-curious-facts/ (last visited Jan 17, 2014). 
 11.  Arbitration is “[a] method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third parties 
who are usu[ally] agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision is binding.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 119 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed. 2009). 
 12. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs) are technically distinct, but frequently used interchangeably. RAJ BHALA, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 641–42 (3d ed. 2008). 
Since the distinction is not essential to this Note, I will use the term Free Trade Agreement. For the 
sake of clarity, I will also not use the abbreviation. 
 13. USTR, White House Fact Sheet: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) 
(June 2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/june/wh-ttip. 
 14. USTR, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), http://www.ustr.gov/tpp; William Mauldin, Fast-
Track Opponents Rally Support, WASH. WIRE (Feb. 18, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/ 
02/04/fast-track-opponents-build-grassroots-opposition/?mg=blogs-wsj&url=http%253A%252F%25 
2Fblogs.wsj.com%252Fwashwire%252F2014%252F02%252F04%252Ffast-track-opponents-build-
grassroots-opposition. 
 15. Given the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report and near 
uniform scientific consensus on climate change, the view that environmental protection and economic 
development are mutually exclusive interests is a very shortsighted take on economic prosperity. 
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Part I of this Note provides a broad introduction to Free Trade 
Agreements, International Investment Agreements, ISDS provisions, and 
some ways trade and the environment intersect. Part II evaluates some of 
the available data regarding trends in free trade agreements and includes a 
brief discussion of nine specific ISDS disputes with environmental 
components.
16
 Part III provides a number of suggestions for ways to better 
incorporate into ISDS decision-making more effective methods of 
evaluating the authenticity of, and ultimately protecting, domestic 
environmental laws. 
I. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
A. World Trade and International Investment Agreements 
Modern international trade law was codified when twenty-three 
countries signed the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on 
October 30, 1947.
17
 GATT was the governing document for international 
trade from 1947 until December 15, 1993 when GATT contracting parties 
established the World Trade Organization (WTO), incorporating GATT.
18
 
Today GATT-WTO has 160 member countries.
19
 GATT-WTO policies 
are based on economic theories that the reduction of trade barriers 
improves global living conditions.
20
 To this end, GATT-WTO provides for 
 
 
Thomas Stocker, Qin Dahe & Gian-Kasper Plattner, WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE IPCC 
FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2013), 
http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/review-drafts/. 
 16. In this context, a dispute refers to any dispute brought under an ISDS or similar provision. As 
will be discussed in greater depth in Part II, not all cases have the same amount of information publicly 
available. Thus certain disputes were eliminated based not on the substance of the issues, but the 
amount of information available.  
 17. RAJ BHALA, supra note 12, at 7. The GATT was meant to be a temporary document to ensure 
that countries did not revert to protectionism in the years immediately following World War II until 
the Havana Charter was ratified, which would have established the International Trade Organization 
(ITO). US President Harry Truman did not even submit the treaty to Congress, however, knowing that 
it would not have been ratified given the number of international organizations and treaties the US had 
recently signed. Id. 
 18. Id. at 6–7. 
 19. WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE ORGANIZATION—MEMBERS AND 
OBSERVERS, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 
2014). The U.S. recognizes 195 independent states. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INDEPENDENT STATES IN 
THE WORLD, http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2014). 
 20. The GATT preamble states in part: “Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living . . . . Being 
desirous of contributing to these objectives by . . . substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to 
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce . . .” The General 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss1/8
  
 
 
 
 
2015] INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 135 
 
 
 
 
uniform trade laws, aid in resolving trade disputes between nations, and 
facilitation of global trade through other mechanisms.
21
 One essential 
requirement of GATT-WTO is that all members treat other members with 
“most favored nation” status, which means that the lowest tariff rate one 
WTO member gives any country is the tariff rate all WTO members must 
receive.
22
 
There is, however, an exception to the most favored nation requirement 
that was written into the GATT-WTO regime from the very start. GATT 
Article XXIV states that, within certain limitations, “[T]he provisions of 
this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting 
parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area . . .”23 This 
Note focuses on the Free Trade Agreements that effectively allow for such 
preferential treatment among a small number of countries
24
 and deals 
specifically with issues of foreign investment, called International 
Investment Agreements (IIAs).
25
 
This is not a minor exception to GATT-WTO rules. As of June 15, 
2014, 585 regional trade agreements had been reported to the WTO, with 
 
 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Jan. 1, 1948, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm (last visited Jan 12, 2014). 
 21. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: WHO WE ARE, http://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm. Despite the intention of the WTO to centralize 
global trade, around the time of its establishment the number of bilateral and plurilateral preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs), almost all Free Trade Agreements, exploded. IIA ISSUES NOTE, supra note 
17, at 1–4. 
 Some Free Trade Agreements are regional, like the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Many more 
are Bilateral Investment Treaties dealing exclusively with investment arrangements between two 
countries. Some are issue-based, such as the Energy Charter Treaty. Energy Charter Treaty (1994), 
available at http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=28 (last visited Oct 27, 2013). Lastly, many of the 
multilateral trade agreements include side-deals regarding issues of particular interest to only a few of 
the signatories or on a topic about which no consensus could be found.  
 22. RAJ BHALA, supra note 12, at Chapter 11. 
 23. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), supra note 20, at XXIV:5. 
 24. See generally RAJ BHALA, supra note 12, at Part 6.  
 25. The most common type of IIA is a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), but there are also 
regional investment treaties and investment provisions or chapters in bilateral and multilateral Free 
Trade Agreements that deal with many more issues. Chapters 11 and 10 respectively of the well-
known North American Free Trade Agreement and Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (“CAFTA” or “CAFTA-DR”) are examples of the third type of IIA. Howard Mann, 
International Investment Agreements, Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and Opportunities, 
INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 3–5 (Feb. 2008), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/iia_business_ 
human_rights.pdf; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, SERIES ON ISSUES 
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II 18 n.1 (July 25, 2014) [hereinafter “UNCTAD 
Series II”].  
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379 in force.
26
 As of 2012, there were nearly 3,200 Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs).
27
 The popularity of these agreements likely reflects the 
challenges inherent in consensus decision-making among 160 nations.
28
 
Over the last few decades, many of the multi-national free trade 
agreements have sparked major protests by activists concerned with labor 
rights, environmental sustainability, exploitation of developing nations, 
and other social issues.
29
 
B. Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Provisions  
The theory behind a trans-national system for dispute resolution is that 
it is better equipped to equitably resolve an investor’s dispute with a state 
than the state’s own domestic court system. Investors often fear political 
influence, incompetence, or “home town justice” in domestic court 
systems.
30
 Much of this fear is based in reality. There are ineffective, 
inefficient, or corrupt domestic judicial systems that discourage foreign 
direct investment.
31
 The predictability of trade rights and investment 
 
 
 26. “[C]ounting goods, services and accessions separately . . .” Regional Trade Agreements 
Gateway, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
 27. UNCTAD Series II, supra note 25, at 18; ICSID Database of BITs, supra note 10. “BITs 
give investors from each party the right to submit an investment dispute with the government of the 
other party to international arbitration. There is no requirement to use that country’s domestic courts.” 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
 28. Many are concerned that these smaller agreements are creating pockets of free trade, rather 
than increasing global free trade, resulting in a complex web of agreements that are difficult to enforce 
and result in a much more imbalanced trade system. It further limits the rights of small nations who 
feel pressure to engage in Free Trade Agreements but have little bargaining power in those 
negotiations. As James Gathi explains, “[t]he turn to regional [Free Trade Agreements] . . . makes it 
much easier to bully smaller groups of countries to commit to the objectives of the Washington 
Consensus or neoliberal economic restructuring than it would be through arduous multilateral trade 
negotiations at the WTO.” James Thuo Gathii, The Neoliberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements, 86 
WASH. L. REV. 421, 426 (2011). However, some recognize the value in the shifting towards regional 
agreements given the stalemates that have repeatedly stalled multilateral efforts. Rafael Leal-Arcas, 
Climate Change Mitigation from the Bottom up: Using Preferential Trade Agreements to Promote 
Climate Change Mitigation, 7 CARBON CLIM. L. REV. 34 (2013). 
 29. See, e.g., David L. Markell & John H. Knox, The Innovative North American Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, supra note 7, at 1; Sanford E. Gaines, supra note 7, at 174. 
 30. William Park & Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: 
NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 369 (2003). There are ineffective, inefficient, or corrupt 
domestic judicial systems that discourage foreign direct investment. However, there is also value and 
historical precedent for utilizing domestic judicial systems.  
 31. Initially, protection of investors in trade agreements intended to encourage foreign direct 
investment (FDI) with or in states where the judicial system could not be trusted to protect investments 
from other private interests or even the government itself. It does not seem like a stretch to compare 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss1/8
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opportunities can also cause barriers to investment given that investors 
often work in many different countries and thus many different legal 
systems.
32
  
There is, however, value and historical precedent for relying more 
heavily on domestic judicial systems than is the practice today.
33
 
Furthermore, there are numerous flaws in the international arbitration 
system that include its largely ad hoc structure, reliance on private firms 
and lawyers,
34
 and failure to successfully consider non-investment factors 
even when the trade agreement provides for the protection of human rights 
at issue.
35
  
ISDS provisions have grown more controversial over the last few 
years
36
 as the number of disputes under ISDS have increased 
dramatically.
37
 The number of disputes settled in favor of investors has 
also risen in recent years. As of the end of 2012, 244 disputes had been 
resolved through arbitration under various ISDS provisions with 
approximately 42% decided in favor of the state, 31% decided in favor of 
the investor, and 27% settled, typically on confidential terms.
38
 In 2012, 
 
 
modern FDI between large corporations and small developing nations to the concession agreements of 
the early 20th century. Concession agreements required very little of the investors, and actually gave 
states less flexibility than today. Detlev F. Vagts et al., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 528–29 
(4th ed. 2008). 
 32. Charles H. Brower II, supra note 7, at 48. 
 33. “Historically, an alien investor was required to exhaust local remedies before its state could 
espouse a claim before an international tribunal. Local courts were first entitled to remedy the alleged 
wrongdoing before recourse to an international forum was available. Under [Bilateral Investment 
Treaties], these rules have either been eliminated or modified.” Carlos G. Garcia, supra note 7, at 313. 
 34. For example, large law firms have the incentive to encourage these disputes because they 
earn huge sums of money for participation in the prolonged and complex disputes. Furthermore, these 
same law firms often provide attorneys to serve as arbitrators on other cases. As a result, the whole 
process has the potential to be distorted. Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting From Injustice: 
How Law Firms, Arbitrators And Financiers Are Fuelling An Investment Arbitration Boom at 19–23 
(2012). Please note, this source has been incredibly helpful, as it has consolidated information on law 
firms that is difficult to find elsewhere. However, it is one of a few sources that I cite that has been 
compiled with a very evident bias. The information seems to be accurate and very well researched, but 
the angle is strong enough that its notice is important.  
 35. Susan L. Karamanian, The Place of Human Rights In Investor-State Arbitration, 17 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 423, 424 (2013). 
 36. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of 
Mediation into Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 71, 71 (2013) 
(“states and investors increasingly express concerns regarding the costs associated with the arbitration 
process, some states refuse to comply with arbitral awards, other states hesitate to sign new bilateral 
investment treaties, and citizens have begun to engage in popular unrest at the prospect of investment 
treaty arbitration.”); UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A sequel, UNCTAD Series on 
Issues in International Investment Agreements II at 13–17, 24–29 (July 2014), http://unctad.org/en/ 
PublicationsLibrary/diaeia2013d2_en.pdf. 
 37. IIA Issues Note, supra note 10, at 2. 
 38. Id. at 5. 
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however, 12 out of 17 decisions, 71%, rendered on the merits accepted—
in part or in full—the claims of the investors.39 
Drafters of trade agreements and individual commercial contracts can 
choose to bring disputes under an ISDS in numerous forums.
40
 The most 
commonly used forum is the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), a non-profit arm of the World Bank.
41
 The 
second most commonly used forum is the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
42
 Each forum has its own set of 
rules, amendable by contract, but they generally follow the same pattern. 
Most arbitrations are an “ad hoc process” where the arbitrators “are private 
agents, typically practicing international lawyers, or professors of 
international law” selected and approved by the parties.43 These 
individuals often represent clients as attorneys in other disputes at the 
same tribunals.
44
 
The primary criticisms of ISDS provisions can be broken down into 
three categories. The first is that these provisions seem to give greater 
power to foreign investors than nations, by permitting investors to file 
claims against governments.
45
 ISDS provisions usually provide a distinct 
forum in which foreign investors, not governments, can bring a dispute.
46
 
This power shift is also evident in how investors seek to avoid use of 
domestic courts for settling such disputes if at all possible, even in 
instances when the investment agreement requires utilization of the 
 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. These arbitration forums include the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Cairo 
Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA), and the London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA). IIA Issues Note, supra note 10, at 2. 
 41. Of the 58 disputes filed in 2012, 39 were filed with ICSID, seven under UNCITRAL rules, 
five under the SCC, one each under the ICC, CRCICA, and an ad hoc arbitration, and five with 
unknown rules and venues. IIA Issues Note, supra note 10, at 2. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Carlos G. Garcia, supra note 7, at 313. 
 44. Lori Wallach, “A Corporate Trojan Horse”: Obama Pushes Secretive TPP Trade Pact, 
WOULD REWRITE SWATH OF U.S. LAWS 22:28 (2013), http://www.democracynow.org/2013/10/4/ 
a_corporate_trojan_horse_obama_pushes (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). 
 45. There may be a shift, however, in States’ ability to bring claims. According to the UNCTAD, 
2012 saw the first time in “treaty-based ISDS proceedings, [where] an arbitral tribunal affirmed its 
jurisdiction over a counterclaim that had been lodged by a respondent State against the investor.” 
UNCTAD publishes its annual review of investor-State dispute settlement cases (Apr 2013), 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=453; See also IIA Issues Note, supra 
note 10.  
 46. Investor–State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration at 10 (2010), 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf. 
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domestic system first.
47
 Investors can challenge not only alleged violations 
of customary international law and investment contracts, but even 
domestic laws of the host State.
48
 Thus, ISDS provisions allow for largely 
domestic issues to be brought in front of a non-judicial arbitration panel 
instead of in domestic courts, even though the case is ultimately ruling on 
how a domestic law relates to the trade agreement.  
The second category that critics focus on is structural failures within 
the arbitration system. In 2012, the Corporate Europe Observatory and the 
Transnational Institute came out with a report that evaluated bias within 
the arbitration system and tried to explain an increasing trend of law firms 
pushing corporations to bring disputes under ISDS provisions.
49
 The report 
claims, 
The alleged neutrality of arbitration is . . . a myth. A small group of 
elite arbitrators emerged promising to be neutral ‘judges’ in whom, 
as arbitrator William Park said, “people could entrust their wealth 
and welfare”. But, instead, they have used their power and influence 
to secure government-hostile rules and a steady flow of 
multimilliondollar [sic] lawsuits.
50
  
The report outlines the role of lawyers who profit financially from ISDS 
disputes in encouraging governments to sign agreements with ISDS 
provisions in the first place, encouraging investors to bring disputes under 
ISDS provisions, especially when governments are in crisis, and 
frequently publishing academic reporting on arbitration guiding the field.
51
 
The monetary cost, and profit, is often millions of dollars.
52
  
 
 
 47. For example, during the most recent U.S. Supreme Court term the Court heard an appeal 
from UNCITRAL about whether the panel had authority to adjudicate a dispute that had not satisfied 
the pre-arbitration requirement that the investor litigate the dispute first in local courts. The D.C. 
Circuit court vacated UNCITRAL’s ruling finding that it did not have authority to hear the dispute. 
Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1365–66 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed that decision because treaties should be treated as normal contracts. As such, 
the local litigation requirement is “for the arbitrators [to decide], and courts must review their 
determinations with deference.” BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1204 (2014); 
See also BG Group Plc. v. The Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL (2013), www.italaw.com/ 
cases/143. 
 48. UNCTAD Series II, supra note 25, at 39. 
 49. Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting From Injustice: How law firms, arbitrators and 
financiers are fuelling an investment arbitration boom (2012). 
 50. Id. at 71. 
 51. Id. at 8. 
 52. Disputes take many years to complete and cost massive amounts of money. “[L]egal and 
arbitration costs for the parties in recent ISDS cases have averaged over USD 8 million with costs 
exceeding USD 30 million in some cases.” ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INVESTOR-STATE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PUBLIC CONSULTATION 18 (May 16–July 9, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/ 
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In addition, the make-up of decision-makers is not representative of the 
parties. Sixty-eight percent of the arbitrators, conciliators, and ad hoc 
committee members that judge the tribunal cases are from North America 
and Western Europe, while their home countries represent only 6% of all 
state respondents in ICSID cases.
53
 The small number of unrepresentative 
attorneys who function as arbitrators and lawyers in ISDS disputes is not a 
unique challenge, even in the international economic legal community.
54
 
The World Trade Organization has also been criticized for choosing 
insiders as appellate panelists.
55
 
The third category of criticism is the ultimate consequences of these 
provisions on the rights of individual citizens or the environment. For 
example, grassroots organizing in El Salvador and activists world-wide 
have been fighting Pacific Rim Mining Corporation’s 2009 ISDS claim to 
try and prevent Pacific Rim from mining in El Salvador.
56
 Summarizing 
all three criticisms, one trade activist group described the anticipated 
impact of an ISDS provision in the Trans-Pacific Partnership as follows: 
“This regime empowers corporations to skirt national courts and sue our 
governments before tribunals of private sector lawyers operating under 
UN and World Bank rules to demand taxpayer compensation for domestic 
regulatory policies that investors believe diminish their ‘expected future 
profits.’”57 
C. International Environmental Protection Measures 
There are major concerns associated with using trade to establish or 
enforce social priorities on a global scale.
58
 While somewhat unusual with 
regard to the inherent multi-national nature of certain environmental 
 
 
investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291642.pdf; See also Investor–State Disputes: 
Prevention and Alternatives To Arbitration, 16–18 (2010), http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_ 
en.pdf; William Park & Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, supra note 30.  
 53. The ICSID Caseload—Statistics, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 11, 18 (2013), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? 
requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English 
41. 
 54. RAJ BHALA, supra note 12, at 167. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Empowering People and Protecting Rights in El Salvador: Resistance to Pacific 
Rim Mining Company, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Summer 2014), 
http://www.ciel.org/HR_Envir/PacRim_Home.html. For more discussion of this case, see infra note 
91.  
 57. TPP’s Investment Rules Harm The Environment, PUBLIC CITIZEN http://www.citizen.org/ 
documents/fact-sheet-tpp-and-environment.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2014). 
 58. RAJ BHALA, supra note 12. 
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challenges such as air or water pollution and climate change, debate 
around the environmental impact and incorporation of environmental 
concerns into trade agreements largely tracks other social issues. For 
example, many ISDS disputes are related to mining rights in developing 
nations that are often rejected by communities due to environmental and 
public health concerns.
59
 General arguments against free trade tend to 
similarly focus on the disparate impact on developing nations rooted in the 
trade structure.
60
 For example, environmental deterioration will 
disproportionately impact the poor and citizens of developing nations. 
This is due to the presence of harmful extractive industries (like mining), 
as well as insufficient resources to effectively adapt to climate changes, 
which will only become more severe as time goes on.
61
 
There are thousands of international agreements that establish some 
form of environmental protection, and these agreements are beginning to 
build a consensus on what qualifies as environmental protection. In fact, 
most Free Trade Agreements include explicit language protecting the 
environment within the trade agreement itself
62
 or in side agreements 
 
 
 59. See, e.g., Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 
(2014), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (search “Case No. ARB/09/12”). See infra 
note 88 and associated text for discussion of the case.  
 60. An alternative that some propose is Fair Trade: 
Fair Trade goods are just that. Fair. From far-away farms to your shopping cart, products that 
bear our logo come from farmers and workers who are justly compensated. We help farmers 
in developing countries build sustainable businesses that positively influence their 
communities. We’re a nonprofit, but we don’t do charity. Instead, we teach disadvantaged 
communities how to use the free market to their advantage. With Fair Trade USA, the money 
you spend on day-to-day goods can improve an entire community’s day-to-day lives.  
What is Fair Trade?, FAIR TRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/what-is-fair-trade (last visited Sept. 10, 
2014). 
 61. This concern is variously referred to as Environmental Justice, Environmental Equity, and 
Environmental Racism. There has been a significant amount of research conducted on disparities both 
domestically and internationally about the ability to prevent environmental harm as well as ability to 
respond and protect the health of citizens in various regions. Environmental Justice and Equity, XIII 
SUSTAIN. DEV. LAW POLICY 1 (2012); Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 
ENVIRON. LAW REPORT 10681 (2000). 
 62. CAFTA’s investment chapter (Chapter 10) incorporated a slightly stronger provision than 
just “protecting the environment,” but is still viewed by environmentalists to be insufficient. 
Earthjustice, Friends of the Earth, Conservation Voters, National Environmental Trust, National 
Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club, & U.S. Public Interest Research Group, U.S. Groups Oppose the 
Central American Free Trade Agreement: The CAFTA Signed Today Falls Short on the Environment, 
PUBLIC CITIZEN (May 28, 2004), www.citizen.org/documents/CAFTA_Fact_Sheet_Enviro.pdf. In 
2011, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development published a survey of 
environmental considerations within 1,623 trade agreements. Two of the findings: (1) The first time 
environmental language was included in international investment agreements is in the 1985 China-
Singapore Bilateral Investment Treaty. (2) Sixteen treaties include provisions allowing environmental 
experts to consult ISDS panels for environmental disputes. Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, 
Environmental Concerns in International Investment Agreements: A Survey, OECD Working Papers 
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following a pattern.
63
 The International Environmental Agreements 
Database Project has 3,085 binding agreements,
64
 519 non-binding 
agreements,
65
 and 133 of 1,623 international investment agreements 
include references to environmental concerns.
66
 
There are prominent examples of international agreements that have 
effectively dealt with an environmental challenge and those that have been 
either ineffective or simply unused. A common comparison is the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer signed in 
1987, and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change signed in 1997.
67
 The Montreal Protocol is 
considered a huge success.
68
 The Kyoto Protocol, on the other hand, which 
was negotiated as a part of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) annual meeting of party nations on Climate 
Change, has been ratified by fewer nations. Moreover, many of the signees 
are not even complying with their obligations.
69
  
 
 
on International Investment, No. 2011/1, OECD Investment Division (2011), at 7–8, 11, 
www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/48083618.pdf.  
 63. At the same time NAFTA was signed, the same signatory countries established the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) which in turn established the 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) in order “to support cooperation among the 
NAFTA partners to address environmental issues of continental concern, including the environmental 
challenges and opportunities presented by continent-wide free trade.” About the CEC, COMMISSION 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&SiteNodeID= 
310&BL_ExpandID=154 (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).  
 64. 1,598 Bilateral Environmental Agreements, 1,241 Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 
and 246 Other. Ronald B. Mitchell, International Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database Project 
(2002–2014), http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?query=home-contents.php (last visited Sept. 28, 2014). 
 65. Id. 206 Bilateral Environmental Non-binding Instruments, 215 Multilateral Environmental 
Non-binding Instruments, and 98 Other.  
 66. Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, supra note 62, at 7. This large number indicates that a 
much larger number of international agreements, with focuses other than the environment, likely 
attempt to incorporate environmental protections. Id. at 22. 
 67. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal And Kyoto: A Tale Of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007); see also Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10 (1987), 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “Montreal Protocol”]; 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10 1977, 37 
I.L.M. 22, available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php 
[hereinafter “Kyoto Protocol”]. 
 68. Elizabeth R. DeSombre, The Experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly Remarkable, 
and Remarkably Particular, 19 UCLA J. ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 49, 49 (2000/2001) (“By most accounts, 
the treaty process for addressing ozone depletion is an unqualified success. It has achieved near 
universal participation, with 170 states party to the Montreal Protocol, and a substantial fraction of 
those party to the London, Copenhagen, and Montreal Amendments to the Protocol. It has 
fundamentally changed the way certain industries conduct their business, already creating in some 
countries a complete phaseout of certain classes of chemicals.” (internal citations omitted). 
 69. Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 67, at 4. 
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One example of an unused international environmental agreement is 
the dispute resolution provision under the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), negotiated and signed as a part of 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
70
 The “state-to-
state consultation and dispute resolution process” was meant to be the 
“teeth” of NAAEC, wherein “one country [could] submit a claim against 
another for a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its domestic 
environmental laws” in a way that affected trade between the two 
nations;
71
 however, the consultation and dispute resolution process has 
never been used even though disputes implicating environmental issues 
have arisen under NAFTA.
72
 
In addition, there are multi-national organizations aggressively seeking 
to build international consensus on climate action.
73
 Most prominent is the 
UNFCCC, which gathers delegates from 190 nations in addition to non-
governmental observers for the annual meeting called Conference of the 
Parties (COP).
74
 These meetings work towards creating and enforcing a 
binding agreement on how responsibility to mitigate and adapt to climate 
change will be distributed among participating nations.
75
 The Kyoto 
Protocol, for example, was adopted at COP 3.
76
 The last few years have 
been building up to the 21
st
 COP in 2015 at which a major, binding 
agreement is anticipated.
77
 
Finally, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a 
“scientific body under the auspices of the United Nations” that aims to 
 
 
 70. Linda J. Allen, supra note 2, at 123, 144. 
 71. Id. at 137, 144. 
 72. Id. See, e.g., S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, infra note 98. 
 73. As an example of the frustration felt by environmental activists at the slow pace of an 
international response to climate change, environment and development non-governmental 
organizations and other activists walked out of this year’s UN Conference on Climate Change (COP 
19). Director of Oxfam International, Winnie Byanyima, explained: “We are walking out of these talks 
because governments need to know that enough is enough. . . . The stakes are too high to allow 
governments to make a mockery of these talks”. Many who chose not to join the walk out share the 
frustrations of the protesters. John Vidal & Fiona Harvey, Green groups walk out of UN climate talks 
Environment and development groups protest at slow speed and lack of ambition at Warsaw 
negotiations, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/ 
21/mass-walk-out-un-climate-talks-warsaw. 
 74. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/ 
2860.php (last visited Aug 24, 2014); N.Y. Times Editorial Board, Running Out of Time, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr.20, 2014), available at http://nytimes.com/2014/04/21/opinion/running-out-of-time.html?_r= 
1&referrer=. 
 75. UN Climate Change Newsroom, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://newsroom.unfccc.int (last visited Aug. 24, 2014); U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, UNFCC Handbook (1996) [hereinafter UNFCCC Handbook]. 
 76. UNFCC Handbook, supra note 75, at 18. 
 77. N.Y. Times Editorial Board, supra note 74.  
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provide the public with a comprehensive overview of the “current state of 
knowledge in climate change.”78 Participating scientists and member 
governments periodically publish reports about the state and causes of 
climate change based on a comprehensive review of scientific, technical, 
and socio-economic literature.
79
 The IPCC published its most recent 
report, composed of three working group publications, in 2013 and 2014.
80
 
Whereas UNFCCC intends to bring parties together for action, the IPCC 
creates reports to guide that action.
81
 
II. THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES THROUGH DISCONNECTED MECHANISMS 
Over the last few decades it has become increasingly clear that non-
commercial issues are an integral part of investment agreements, both in 
the development and implementation stages.
82
 As more industries and 
interests realize the power of these large financial structures, more issues 
that are not purely economic are written into such agreements. For 
example, the most controversial trade deal currently being negotiated, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), has over 600 official corporate “trade 
advisors” but remains hidden from the public. Until very recently, it was 
even hidden from members of the U.S. Congress who are required to make 
the agreement binding in the U.S.
83
  
 
 
 78. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Organization, http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
organization/organization.shtml (Aug. 24, 2014). 
 79. Id.  
 80. Reports, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
 81. “The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the leading international body 
for the assessment of climate change. It was established by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 to provide the world 
with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential 
environmental and socio-economic impacts. In the same year, the UN General Assembly endorsed the 
action by WMO and UNEP in jointly establishing the IPCC.” Id. 
 82. UNCTAD ISDS Report, supra note 4.  
 83. Elizabeth Palmberg, The Insider List, SOJOURNERS, http://sojo.net/blogs/2012/06/29/insider-
list (June 29, 2012); Zach Carter, Alan Grayson On Trans-Pacific Partnership: Obama Secrecy Hides 
‘Assault On Democratic Government’, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/ 
06/18/alan-grayson-trans-pacific-partnership_n_3456167.html (June 18, 2013); Larry Catá Backer, 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Japan, China, the U.S., and the Emerging Shape of the New 
WorldTrade Regulatory Order, 13 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 049 (2014), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/globalstudies/vol13/iss1/6. 
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A. Survey of Arbitration Cases with Environmental Issues  
Even when human rights defenses are raised in the context of an ISDS 
dispute, the arguments are infrequently noted, let alone a factor, in 
arbitrators’ decisions.84 This appears to be true of environmental defenses 
as well. There are many possible reasons why human rights and 
environmental issues are not often successfully raised as defenses in ISDS 
arbitrations. It could be that such defenses were raised but there is 
insufficient public documentation for a researcher to determine either way. 
It also could be that investors usually only bring disputes when the 
government action should not be defensible based on the language of the 
agreement; however, given the number of disputes, it is likely that at least 
some of the cases should be decided for the state based on the spirit of 
environmental chapters, but those protections lack the necessary teeth to 
provide a useful defense. 
Given the problems with taking investor-state disputes outside of 
domestic courts, and the distortions within the arbitration system itself, it 
is not surprising that the record shows environmental laws frequently 
struck down as violations of some trade agreement. The UN Center on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) maintains a database of disputes 
arbitrated under ISDS provisions for all Free Trade Agreements it has on 
record. This includes regional agreements such NAFTA and CAFTA, as 
well as Bilateral Investment Treaties between two countries, and issue-
specific treaties like the Energy Charter Treaty.
85
 In total, the database 
includes 561 disputes.
86
 Documentation and reporting is inconsistent as it 
is “primarily built on information provided by governments on a voluntary 
basis.”87 The database does include a substantial amount of information 
 
 
 84. Susan L. Karamanian, The Place Of Human Rights In Investor-State Arbitration, 17 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 423, 426–28 (2013). 
 85. IIA Databases, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, http://unctad.org/ 
en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/IIA-Tools.aspx. Initially I tried 
searching the database for environment-related disputes using the “Nature of Claim” category. 
However, a significant number (possibly a majority) or cases have no description in this column. 
Instead, I copied the database into an excel spreadsheet and looked through all the information 
provided to flag the ones the looked the most promising based primarily on the nature of the claim, the 
treaty it was under (for example, I looked more carefully at a dispute that arose under the Energy 
Charter Treaty), if the investor was a mining company or other common offender, and finally whether 
the case was mentioned in any of my other research. Lastly, I eliminated the cases for which there was 
insufficient documents (either on the UNCTAD database or elsewhere) to evaluate the nature of the 
arguments. 
 86. IIA Databases, supra note 85.  
 87. As is common with arbitration generally and commercial arbitration specifically, much of the 
procedure is confidential. Sanford E. Gaines, supra note 7, at 177. 
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when available, including: the nature of the argument, legal issues, the 
controlling treaty, venue for arbitration, the decision and the final award.
88
 
Based on the available information and research conducted by outside 
groups, there are forty-six relevant cases for environmental disputes.
89
 Of 
those cases, seven were awarded in favor of the investor, four in favor of 
the state, twenty-five were settled, twenty-four are pending, and three are 
unknown.
90
 The following nine cases are examples of the types of 
controversies at issue (listed in reverse chronological order): Pacific Rim 
Mining Co. v. El Salvador (pending);
91
 Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. 
Canada (pending);
92
 Commerce Group v. El Salvador;
93
 Chevron Corp. v. 
 
 
 88. IIA Databases, supra note 85.  
 89. The disputes that I have included in this sample do not always include complete documents 
about the substantive legal dispute or nature of the investment at issue due to secrecy and lack of a 
formal centralized process for managing this information. As a result, I have included cases based on 
the type of investment described in the database without more information. Descriptions that were 
sufficient for inclusion include most commonly mining, oil and gas, electric power generation, landfill, 
and coal exploration. 
 I chose to include these cases because often times the actual legal issue is secondary. 
Environmentalists are ultimately concerned about ensuring the effective implementation of domestic 
laws when the spirit and purpose are technically in violation of a trade law.  
 90. UNCTAD Database of ISDS Cases, supra note 85.  
 91. Pacific Rim Cayman, a U.S.-based a gold mining corporation, submitted a claim to 
arbitration against the Republic of El Salvador under CAFTA Chapter 10 in ICSID regarding a mining 
permit in El Salvador. The dispute is ongoing. Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 (2008), http://www.italaw.com/cases/783. Pacific Rim Cayman LLC v. 
The Republic of El Salvador, Notice of Intent, 1–2 (2008). See also Marcos Orellana, Amicus Brief 
Highlights the Environmental and Human Rights Impacts of Mining in $77 Million Investment 
Arbitration Case, THE CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.ciel.org/ 
HR_Envir/PAC_RIM_4Mar11.html; Inter-Faith Committee on Latin America, El Salvador 
Environmental Defense Bulletin, ST. LOUIS INTERFAITH COMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICA (2013), 
http://www.ifcla.net/site2/?p=14129. 
 92. U.S. Lone Pine, an American company, launched a $250 million investor-state case against 
Canada in 2012 for its moratorium on hydraulic fracturing (also known as “fracking”). This case was 
brought under NAFTA in UNCITRAL and is pending. Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government 
of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA (Pending), 
(2013), www.italaw.com/cases/documents/1607; TPP’S INVESTMENT RULES HARM THE 
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 57.  
 Supporters of fracking say that it is a way for countries to access natural gas, create jobs, and 
increase domestic sources of energy. Opponents argue that the risk of chemicals contaminating water 
and soil, as well as potential increases in earthquakes, make the process very risky. David Biello, 
Fracking Can Be Done Safely, but Will It Be?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (May 17, 2013), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=can-fracking-be-done-without-impacting-water. 
 93. Starting in 1987, the Commerce Group and San Sebastian Mining were granted various 
exploitation cessions from the government of El Salvador to explore potential mining sites and mining 
permits. Commerce Group Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. v. The Republic of El Salvador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, 18–20, NOTICE OF ARBITRATION 2 para. 7 (2013), http://www.italaw. 
com/cases/296. In 2006, the El Salvador Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources revoked 
claimant’s licenses. Claimants challenged this revocation in Salvadorian courts. Id. at 4 para. 22. In 
2009, prior to a decision in Salvadorian courts, claimants filed Notice of Arbitration in ICSID under 
Articles 10.16.3 and 10.16.4 of CAFTA. Id. at 4 para. 24. See also Douglas González, El Salvador 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss1/8
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Ecuador;
94
 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic;
95
 MTD Equity 
Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile;
96
 Methanex Corp. v. United 
States;
97
 S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada;
98
 Metalclad v. United Mexican 
States;
99
 and Ethyl Corp v. Canada.
100
 
As with most litigation, the mere act of bringing (or threatening to 
bring) a case influences behavior given the investment of time, money, 
and reputation ISDS arbitration demands. In international arbitration, the 
monetary cost is often millions of dollars.
101
 For most of the countries 
 
 
won case with Commerce Group!, ST. LOUIS INTERFAITH COMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICA (2013), 
http://www.ifcla.net/site2/?p=14198. 
 94. This dispute was brought in UNCITRAL under the Ecuador-United States Bilateral 
Investment Treaty. Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of 
Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23 (2013), http://italaw.com/cases/257. The controversy 
continues to be controversial given the massive judgment against Chevron and pending related cases in 
the U.S. See, e.g., Bill Hamilton, David v. Goliath: An Update on the $19 Billion Judgment in Ecuador 
Against Chevron, CSR WIRE (2013), www.csrwire.com/press_releases/35602-David-v-Goliath-An-
Update-on-the-19-Billion-Judgment-in-Ecuador-Against-Chevron; Sally Burch, Ecuador’s Campaign: 
“The Dirty Hand of Chevron,” TRUTHOUT (Sept. 25, 2013), truth-out.org/opinion/item/19016-
ecuadors-campaign-the-dirty-hand-of-chevron. 
 95. The dispute was brought in ICSID under the Argentina-United States BIT. LG&E Energy 
Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on 
Liability (2008), http://italaw.com/cases/documents/623. 
 96. This dispute was brought in ICSID under the Chile-Malaysia Bilateral Investment Treaty. 
MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, (2007), 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/717 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
 97. The dispute was brought in UNCITRAL under NAFTA. Methanex Corporation v. United 
States of America, (2005), http://italaw.com/cases/683; Sanford E. Gaines, supra note 7, at 183–84. 
 98. S.D. Meyers remediates polychlorinated biphenyl contamination through incineration. In 
order to gain access to the Canadian market, it had to lobby the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
to relax its ban on the movement of such chemicals. The dispute was brought in UNCITRAL under 
NAFTA. Ultimately, Canada’s export ban on PCD waste was found to have more of a protectionist 
purpose, rather than a bona fide environmental regulation. The burden is especially high on 
governments to prove the legitimacy of their environmental regulation when one firm, in this case S.D. 
Meyers, is impacted. Sanford E. Gaines, supra note 7, at 180–82; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of 
Canada, Second Partial Award (2004), http://italaw.com/cases/documents/977. 
 99. “In Metalclad, local authorities in Guadalcazar, Mexico denied a construction permit for the 
investor’s hazardous waste facility, even though the competent federal authorities had already granted 
all necessary environmental approvals. In reaching their decision, the local authorities gave the 
investor no notice, provided no opportunity to be heard, and identified no construction defects in the 
facility. Later, the outgoing governor of the State of San Luis Potosi decreed the site to be part of an 
ecological preserve. The tribunal unanimously held that these two actions permanently barred 
operation of the facility and, therefore, constituted an indirect expropriation and a measure tantamount 
to expropriation, respectively.” Charles H. Brower II, supra note 7, at 48. 
 100. The dispute was brought in UNCITRAL under NAFTA. Ethyl Corporation v. The 
Government of Canada, 182–83 (1998), http://www.italaw.com/cases/409. 
 101. Disputes take many years to complete and cost massive amounts of money. “[L]egal and 
arbitration costs for the parties in recent ISDS cases have averaged over USD 8 million with costs 
exceeding USD 30 million in some cases.” INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PUBLIC 
CONSULTATION, 18 (May 16–July 9, 2012). http://www.oecd.org/investment/international 
investmentagreements/50291642.pdf; Investor–State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to 
Arbitration, 16–18 (2010), http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf; William Park & Guillermo 
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defending their decisions in an international tribunal, that amount of 
money can have a significant impact on the countries’ ability to provide 
basic government services for its people.
102
 There is a strong incentive for 
states to settle, even when they are likely to or should win, in order to 
avoid such lengthy litigation with foreign investors that have the resources 
to fund multi-year, multi-million dollar disputes.
103
 
B. The Trans-Pacific Partnership  
The respective rights of investors and States are of particular 
importance right now as 12 countries
104
 near the conclusion of the massive 
and highly controversial Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations.
105
 
The TPP is a major regional Free Trade Agreement that is being heralded 
by supporters as an effective way to boost global trade by bringing 
together countries that produce over 40% of the world’s gross domestic 
product (GDP).
106
 Furthermore, this trade agreement would fit into the 
Obama Administration’s “pivot to Asia” by increasing connectivity.107 
Opponents of the TPP have reacted to the size by ominously referring to it 
as “NAFTA on steroids” with regards to its potential impact on labor, the 
environment, and other such issues.
108
  
 
 
Aguilar Alvarez, supra note 30, at 367, 380, 382. Recently, an investor was awarded $50 billion in a 
dispute against Russia. UPDATE 7-Court orders Russia to pay $50 bln for seizing Yukos assets, 
REUTERS (July 28, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/28/russia-yukos-idUSL6N0Q30 
QX20140728. 
 102. In this report, the authors provide context for the real impact of government money being 
spent on frivolous arbitration rather than services. For example: “In the case of Plama Consortium v 
Bulgaria, . . . [the claim] was ultimately found to be fraudulent. . . . [but Bulgaria was] forced to pay 
. . . US$6,243,357 [in legal fees]. At that time Bulgaria was grappling with a healthcare crisis due to a 
shortage of nurses—the money could have paid the salaries of more than 1,796 Bulgarian nurses.” Pia 
Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, supra note 49, at 15. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Currently, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam have committed to the TPP negotiations. 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Leaders Statement, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/october/tpp-leaders-statement (last visited 
Oct 28, 2013). Some predict that China will eventually join the TPP as well. Wellington, China 
unlikely to join TPP trade talks anytime soon—NZ trade minister, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/15/newzealand-china-tpp-idUSL3N0I542F20131015 (last visited 
Oct 28, 2013). 
 105. See, generally Larry Catá Backer, supra note 83. 
 106. Free trade in the Pacific: A small reason to be cheerful, THE ECONOMIST, (November 19, 
2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21538758 (last visited Oct, 28, 2013). 
 107. Matt Schiavenzaapr, What Exactly Does It Mean That the U.S. Is Pivoting to Asia? And will 
it last?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 15 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/what-
exactly-does-it-mean-that-the-us-is-pivoting-to-asia/274936/. 
 108. Lori Wallach, supra note 44. On Jan. 15, 2014, the Environmental Chapter of TPP was 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss1/8
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TPP negotiations have been conducted in private, so concerns about the 
agreement are based on that privacy, the parties which are known to have 
been at the negotiating table, and chapters that have been leaked to the 
public. The negotiations have been so secretive that even members of the 
U.S. Congress, who are required to approve by two-thirds for any treaty to 
be ratified in the U.S.,
109
 had been kept totally in the dark until recently 
when certain members of congress made a lot of noise and were granted 
limited viewing rights;
110
 however, it has been reported that more than 600 
corporate advisors, including Halliburton and Monsanto, have had access 
to the agreement all along.
111 
 
Three essential chapters were leaked in the past two years: The 
Intellectual Property,
112
 Investment,
113
 and Environmental
114
 Chapters. 
Organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union, not normally 
 
 
leaked to the public by WikiLeaks. Secret TPP Treaty: Environmental Chapter for all 12 nations, 
WIKILEAKS (Nov. 24, 2013). The chapter is much like other environmental treaties: aggressively 
advocating for environmental protection while providing almost no mechanisms for actual 
enforcement of the ideas within it.  
 Lori Wallach, supra note 44, at 14:54 (“‘This is not mainly about trade,’ says Lori Wallach, 
director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch. ‘It is a corporate Trojan horse. The agreement has 29 
chapters, and only five of them have to do with trade. The other 24 chapters either handcuff our 
domestic governments, limiting food safety, environmental standards, financial regulation, energy and 
climate policy, or establishing new powers for corporations.’”). 
 109. According to the US Trade Representative, Fast Track or Trade Promotion Authority 
legislation has been enacted by Congress since 1974 in order to grant the president the authority 
needed to negotiate on equal footing with global leaders. Trade Promotion Authority, OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-promotion-authority 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2013). To supporters, it is “absolutely critical.” David Cay Johnston, Fast track 
stopped, but is it dead?, AL JAZEERA AMERICA, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/1/harry-
reid-fast-tracktradeagreements.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). To critics, however, it hinders public 
debate and the checks and balances envisioned by the framers of the U.S. Constitution when they 
decided the president would sign treaties with the consent of two-thirds of Congress. Id. On January 9, 
2014, a bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate to grant the White House fast-track authority. That bill 
was rejected by the senate. Id. 
 110. Carter, supra note 83. 
 111. “More than 600 representatives of corporations are able to view draft versions of the deal 
because of their positions on government advisory boards, while only a handful of nonprofit groups 
have the same privilege. Members of such boards are not permitted to share information about the 
documents with the public. Staff members from both Republican and Democratic congressional offices 
have also been denied access to the documents.” Zach Carter, Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks: 
Senators Demand Access To Controversial Documents After Leak Huffington Post (1920), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/25/trans-pacific-partnership-documents-sherrod-brown-jeff-
merkley-ron-wyden-robert-menendez_n_1624956.html (last visited Jan 11, 2014); Lori Wallach, supra 
note 44. 
 112. Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)—IP Chapter (2013), available at 
https://wikileaks.org/tpp/. 
 113. TPP Investment Chapter (leaked) (2012), available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/tppinvestment.pdf; More Power to Corporations to Attack Nations. 
 114. TPP Environment Chapter (leaked) (2014), https://wikileaks.org/tpp-enviro/. 
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focused on trade agreements, have sounded the alarm about the 
Intellectual Property chapter in the TPP as potentially limiting free speech 
and access to the Internet in the U.S.
115
  
The leaked investment chapter shows a text substantially similar to the 
now-common ISDS provisions in International Investment Agreements, 
much like NAFTA’s Chapter 11, but also shows the beginnings of internal 
disagreement regarding the inclusion of ISDS provisions.
116
 There is a 
footnote that states: “[ISDS provisions do] not apply to Australia or an 
investor of Australia.”117 Australia is currently the only TPP partner that is 
refusing to sign on to ISDS provisions in the TPP.
118
  
The leaked Environmental Chapter is most notable for its lack of 
teeth.
119
 Since 2007, Congress has effectively ensured that bilateral trade 
agreements include robust, enforceable environmental chapters, similar to 
labor- and agriculture-specific provisions.
120
 The leaked chapter seems to 
reflect both a retreat from that strong environmental position, and perhaps 
the challenge of negotiating with 12 nations in varying economic and 
environmental positions.
121
 
III. CHOOSING A STANDARD: EMPOWERING OR REQUIRING ARBITRATORS 
TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
Trade is a powerful mechanism for creating systems that incentivize 
certain behavior because governments and citizens alike value economic 
 
 
 115. The Biggest Threat to Free Speech and Intellectual Property That You’ve Never Heard Of, 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech-technology-and-liberty-
national-security/biggest-threat-free-speech-and (last visited Feb. 14, 2014); Interview with the ACLU: 
TPP is a Major Threat to Free Speech, Privacy, and Due Process, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/09/aclu-joins-TPP-debate (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). 
 116. TPP Investment Chapter (leaked), supra note 113.  
 117. Id. at 18. 
 118. Amy Schwebel, TPP: The fight over investment rights, THE INTERPRETER (2013), 
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/08/01/TPP-The-investment-chapter-fight.aspx; Kyla Tienhaara 
& Patricia Ranald, Australia’s rejection of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Four potential 
contributing factors, Investment Treaty News (2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/australias-
rejection-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-four-potential-contributing-factors/ (last visited Oct. 19, 
2013). 
 119. Coral Davenport, Administration Is Seen as Retreating on Environment in Talks on Pacific 
Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/politics/ administration-is-
seen-as-retreating-on-environment-in-talks-on-pacific-trade.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) (“As of 
now, the draft environmental chapter does not require the nations to follow legally binding 
environmental provisions or other global environmental treaties. The text notes only, for example, that 
pollution controls could vary depending on a country’s ‘domestic circumstances and capabilities.’”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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prosperity.
122
 Many parties, including governments, multinational 
corporations, non-profit organizations, or power individuals, have thus 
tried to use trade agreements to further their interests. Furthermore, 
citizens groups, politicians, and negotiators have largely been unable to 
develop international agreements outside of trade to effectively confront 
issues such as climate change because of their inability to reach consensus 
on the equitable dispersion of burden. This is partially due to normal 
collective action problems, but also due to the role that pollution played in 
much of the developed worlds’ industrialization process as well as 
technical challenges more unique to environmental solutions.
123
  
The following four suggestions touch on issues caused by ISDS 
generally and environmental concerns in particular. The first is to include 
a truly enforceable clause in Free Trade Agreements that allows for any 
environmental policy to take precedent if consistent with the findings and 
recommendations of an international body such as the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), agreements made during the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the 
Parties (COP), or any of the many previously cited to environmental 
agreements on non-Climate Change issues.  
Investors are worried that governments will create trade barriers for the 
purpose of protecting a domestic market and claim it is for environmental 
purposes.
124
 If there is an agreement at COP 21 in 2015, there will be a 
 
 
 122. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH, CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, FOR VOTERS IT’S STILL 
THE ECONOMY (2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/09/24/for-voters-its-still-the-economy/ (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2014). 
 123. For one proposed solution see Mathias Risse, Who Should Shoulder the Burden? Global 
Climate Change and Common Ownership of the Earth, JOHN F KENNEDY SCH. GOV. HARV. UNIV. 
(2008) (“Philosophically [the] most plausible understanding of collective ownership of the earth does 
not support an equal-per-capita principle, not does it support certain versions of a principle of 
accountability for past emissions. Instead, we end up with a combination of ‘polluter pays’ and ‘ability 
to pay’ principles”). 
 124. One of the most prominent World Trade Organization (WTO) cases, Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (commonly known as “Shrimp-Turtle”), involves environmental 
issues and epitomizes this fear. In Shrimp-Turtle, a group of Asia countries challenged a U.S. law that 
required shrimp sold in the U.S. to have been caught on boats using certain technology that allowed 
endangered sea turtles to escape if caught in fishing nets. Appellate Body Report, United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 46 (Oct. 12, 1998) 
[hereinafter “Shrimp-Turtle”]; The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), supra note 
20, Art. XX(g). The U.S. argued this rule was permitted under Article XX(g) because it was “relating 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.” Peter Morici, ECON. STRATEGY INST., 
RECONCILING TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 78–83 (2002). 
The Appellate Body, however, found that the measure was an “unjustifiable discrimination among 
trading partners.” See Shrimp-Turtle, supra. This case is emblematic because the U.S. claimed to be 
protecting endangered sea turtles, but to the countries that brought the dispute and the WTO Appellate 
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well-developed, heavily negotiated rubric for arbitrators to use in 
determining whether or not an environmental policy is an unjustifiable 
trade barrier or a necessary action to protect an essential domestic policy. 
Furthermore, since one of the most popular arbitration forums is a branch 
of the UN, it would be reasonable for the institution to recognize an 
agreement facilitated by another branch as a valid baseline for determining 
the authenticity of environmental protection. If no agreement is made at 
COP 21, the arbitrators can still utilize non-binding agreements or the 
extensive reporting put out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, for example, to determine whether the state’s actions are 
reasonably consistent with the international consensus on actions that are 
needed on the state level. 
The second suggestion is to include greater expertise on the panel of 
arbitrators. Arbitration panels already include a rotating set of judges who 
are active legal practitioners. If either party is making an environmental 
claim, one of the three judges should have expertise in the area based on a 
previously agreed upon set of criteria, perhaps determined by the 
international body selected for the previous suggestion.
125
 This model 
could also apply to other contentious issues surrounding ISDS such as 
labor rights and food policy, although the scientific expertise may prove 
more essential to disputes based in environmental laws and policies. 
A third suggestion is that we return to a system that requires the use of 
domestic judiciaries or require more rigorous proof that said system would 
be unfair.
126
 A positive side effect of relying more on domestic courts 
rather than international arbitration is that countries interested in attracting 
industry would be incentivized to improve their domestic judicial systems, 
which could positively impact other rights that can be protected through 
litigation.  
The final suggestion is to rethink the entire method of dispute 
resolution given the lack of trust the current method has engendered. 
Arbitration is meant to be a cheaper, faster, and a less procedural dispute 
 
 
Body, it was a trade barrier with an insufficient environmental purpose to trigger an exception to 
GATT-WTO rules.  
 125. Some Bilateral Investment Treaties and other Free Trade Agreements, including NAFTA, 
already allow for an expert to be consulted. Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, supra note 62, at 22. I 
had difficulty determining how often this was actually utilized. However, I would encourage going a 
step further. There should be an environmental expert in a position of more authority than simply 
consulting, perhaps one of the arbitrators, as a party can always request that an expert file an amicus 
brief. Furthermore, it has the potential to give the proceedings more credibility with those primarily 
concerned about the environment (or health or safety). I suggest much more widespread use and 
standardization of this expert arbitrator.  
 126. See supra note 47. 
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resolution mechanism; however, in the international commercial setting, 
this is no longer the case.
127
 Furthermore, activist activity against the 
results of these disputes and government hesitance to continue signing 
trade agreements that include ISDS provisions at the very least indicate a 
lack of trust in the system. There is a growing interest within the dispute 
resolution legal community to extend theories of Procedural Justice to 
international contexts.
128
 The idea is that a more equitable process should 
result in more equitable outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
As we move into an era of expanding trade “partnerships”129 with 
larger regions of the world and wealthier companies that transcend 
national boundaries (and sometimes nationalism), the international 
structures become ever more important. International dispute resolution is 
likely to continue to be more common and, therefore, more powerful. The 
current trajectory is unsustainable in terms of cost in time, money, and 
preservation of state sovereignty. Transparency goes a long way to ensure 
accountability for judicial systems, but the systems themselves need to be 
sound.  
The environmental protections built into the current international 
mechanisms reflect, in large part, the interests that have a strong voice at 
the table when those agreements are negotiated and established. Trade and 
environmental protection are independently complicated and controversial 
policy issues. Environmental protection involves balancing scientific 
understanding of urgency, cost, and feasibility with the need to ensure that 
regulatory burdens are distributed equitably among relevant impacted 
 
 
 127. See supra note 52.  
 128. Procedural justice is the idea that the procedure is integral, or at least not incidental, to the 
parties’ sense of justice, regardless of the outcome of a dispute. There have been numerous studies 
done that indicate if a person feels like their concerns have truly been heard, the will feel like justice 
had been done even if they knew their input had no impact on the proceedings or outcome. See Part III 
for a discussion of procedural justice specifically in the context of international arbitration. Nancy A. 
Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 71, 95–96 (2013) (“If parties perceive a dispute 
resolution or decision-making process as procedurally fair, they are more likely to perceive the 
outcome as substantively fair even if it is adverse to them, comply with that outcome, and perceive the 
institution that provides or sponsors the process as legitimate.”). 
 129. The TPP and another Free Trade Agreement currently being negotiated between Europe and 
the U.S., the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), have elected to include the term 
“partnership” in the name rather than “free trade” even though they are Free Trade Agreements. It 
seems to be reflecting the souring of public opinions of free trade. However, it also feels like a 
semantic method of distinguishing between the last two decades of trade with a new model going 
forward. 
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groups. Trade agreements require similar practical and equitable 
considerations but with regards to opportunity for economic growth and 
necessary levels of protection. For there to be an effective and binding 
international commitment to protect the environment and mitigate climate 
change, the above mentioned protections need to be created and 
implemented by those who understand the complexity of both 
environmental and international economic law. Furthermore, the 
protections need to be woven into the legal structures, and not simply a 
chapter that has little impact on parties’ behavior and the resolution of 
disputes.  
This Note demonstrates to readers and policy makers that even an 
environmental chapter is often not a sufficient device for environmental 
protection, or any other important public right, when that chapter is not 
enforceable. Instead, there needs to be an outside measuring stick by 
which arbitrators can consider the environmental objective in decision 
making and determine whether a state’s action is authentic or an 
unjustifiable trade barrier. There are many organizations and people 
working on creating documents and agreements that reflect such a 
consensus. As awareness of the TPP and T-TIP grow among citizens and 
influence politicians and the effects of climate change become more 
severe, the need to incorporate the efforts of governments and private 
entities seeking an environmental and climate changes consensus into 
international economic law and dispute resolution will become more 
urgent.  
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